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COMMENT
THE STOCK ACT IS INADEQUATE: U.S. INDEX FUNDS
ARE THE SOLUTION TO POLITICAL INSIDER TRADING
Kevin W. Fritzt
I. INTRODUCTION
Members of Congress do not improve the public's poor perception of
them' when their wealth increases during times of economic hardship,2
especially when nearly a majority of them are already millionaires.3 A recent
"60 Minutes" report on congressional insider trading' intensified these
negative sentiments and subjected Congress to increased public scrutiny.'
The report detailed several accounts of congressional insider trading,
illustrating how-under current insider-trading laws-members of
Congress are permitted to trade on insider information.6 With a focus on
the House of Representatives, this Comment starts from the premise that
congressional insider trading is legal under the present laws.' Then, in
addition to advocating that this state of the law is unacceptable, it also
t Business Manager, LIBERTY UNIVERSITY LAw REVIEW, J.D. Candidate, Liberty
University School of Law (2013); B.S., Liberty University (Dec. 2007). I dedicate this
Comment to my wife, Tori, who has sacrificed so much and worked so hard to help me
pursue my J.D. I would like to also thank my friends and family who have all been very
understanding and supportive of my heavy workload.
1. Marc Kilstein, Gallup Poll: Public Trust in Legislative Branch at All-Time Low,
TPMDC (Sep. 24, 2010, 6:11 PM), http://tpmdc.talkingpointsmemo.com/2010/09/american-
trust-in-legislative-branch-at-all-time-low-in-new-gallup-poll.php.
2. Michael Brush, In Congress, Nearly Half the Members Are Millionaires, MSN MONEY
(Jan. 5, 2012, 4:56 PM), http://money.msn.com/investing/latest.aspx?post=70cc8f98-07b4-
4e4e-923e-5569bd82627d.
3. Id.
4. This is also commonly referred to as political insider trading, and it consists of
politicians trading in the stock market on nonpublic information, such as upcoming market
changing information, gained from their position. Babatunde Onabajo, Ban on Political
Insider trading, THE DAILY ORGAN, http://www.dailyorgan.com/2011/12/ban-political-
insider-trading/ (Last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
5. Steve Kroft, Congress: Trading Stock on Inside Information? 60 MINUTES (Nov. 13,
2011, 7:06 PM), available at http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-18560 162-57323527/congress-
trading-stock-on-inside-information/?tag=contentMain;contentBody.
6. Id.
7. See infra Part V.B.
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provides a strict remedy to solve the problem. Implementing such a
solution would not only help our political system take one step closer to
justice, it would also improve America's trust in its politicians and give
members of Congress an incentive to improve the economy.'
To fully appreciate why the strict remedy proposed in this Comment is
necessary, it is first essential to understand the history and pervasiveness of
the problem. Part II describes how American politics have been plagued by
insider trading since this nation's founding and it further develops the facts
about how current politicians are trading on nonpublic information for
personal gain without any legal consequence.' To aid the reader in
understading the scope of current insider-trading laws, this Comment
explains state insider-trading laws in Part III," and then, in Part IV, details
federal insider-trading laws."
In Part V, this Comment examines the Congressional Ethics Rules, and
then it applies current insider-trading laws to situations where members of
Congress engage in political insider trading. 2 This will help the reader
appreciate how current insider-trading laws do not apply to members of
Congress trading on nonpublic information regarding congressional
activity. After seeing that members of Congress commit insider trading
while being immune from insider-trading laws, Part VI discusses the
underlying moral and ethical questions of whether it should be prohibited
under two different perspectives: (1) law and economics; and (2) the biblical
worldview." Finally, in Part VII, after discovering that the practice is not
only inefficient but also immoral, this Comment addresses different ways to
solve the problem and advocates that the best solution is to require
members of Congress to only invest proportionally in the Dow Jones
Industrial Average (hereinafter "DJIA"), Standard and Poor's 500
(hereinafter "S&P 500"), and Nasdaq index funds. This solution would help
solve the problem and give members of Congress incentive to improve the
U.S. economy. 4
8. See infra Part VII.
9. See infra Part II.
10. See infra Part III.
11. See infra Part IV.
12. See infra Part V.
13. See infra Part VI.
14. See infra Part VII.
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II. A DESCRIPTION OF THE PROBLEM OF INSIDER TRADING
A. An American Problem from the Beginning
Congressional use of nonpublic information for the purpose of
individual financial gain has plagued this nation since the founding of the
Republic." As Secretary of the United States Treasury, Alexander Hamilton
advocated for Congress to purchase, and thus give value to, the states'
Revolutionary War debt, as well as the debt created by the Continental
Congress.16 Hamilton met intense resistance to this proposal-particularly
from fiscally responsible states like Virginia, which had already paid most of
its debt."
During the struggle to pass the legislation that would give value to the
Revolutionary War debt, some insiders to the negotiations purchased
devalued certificates and, in the process, tipped off some of their wealthy
supporters to this financial opportunity." Connecticut congressman
Jeremiah Wadsworth, one of Hamilton's associates, allegedly made an $18
million profit from purchasing depreciated paper from southerners."
Senator Robert Morris made an even larger profit of $20 million.20 Many
Americans were outraged when they learned that these government officials
had taken advantage of them by using such nonpublic information for
personal profit.21 As evidenced by Hamilton, Wadsworth, and others, our
nation's birth was accompanied by an unfortunate defect: representatives
entrusted with leading the nation immediately began abusing their
positions of leadership for private financial gain.22
15. 1 JERRY W. MARKHAM, A FINANCIAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES, 78-80 (2002).
16. Id. at 78.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 80.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 78-80.
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B. The Problem Remains
1. Examples of Current Politicians Who Commit Political Insider
Trading
America continues to elect corrupt politicians who practice insider
trading for personal gain, and federal law continues to allow these
politicians to operate without legal hindrance. 23 Representative Brian Baird,
an advocate for the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act
(hereinafter "STOCK Act"),24 is one of the few politicians in this nation to
recognize this as a problem.25 Discussing the issue of political insider
trading, Representative Baird stated, "There are some members who seem
to think the rules just shouldn't apply to us." 26 Unfortunately, those
members of Congress who "think the rules just shouldn't apply"27 are
correct under the current insider-trading laws.28
The television broadcast "60 Minutes" recently released a report on
political insider trading, uncovering several underhanded congressional
financial transactions. 29 For example, in 2005, the House Speaker Dennis
Hastert purchased land near his home.o He then earmarked a bill to build a
highway near the land, and months later, after the earmark was approved,
he sold the land for $2 million, earning-to use the word loosely-a sizable
profit.31 In 2008, when Nancy Pelosi was Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the economy was on the brink of financial collapse,
Speaker Pelosi and her husband purchased 5,000 IPO shares of Visa at $44
per share.32 At the same time, Speaker Pelosi was involved in advancing
legislation through the House that would negatively affect Visa.33 Two days
23. Erika Lovley, New Push to Ban Hill Insider Trading, POLITICO (Oct. 11, 2010 11:34
AM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1010/43400_Page2.html.
24. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, H.R. 1148, 112th Cong.
§§ 1-7 (2011), available at http://www.opencongress.org/bill/ 12-hi 148/text.
25. See Lovley, supra note 23.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. See infra Part V.B.
29. Kroft, supra note 5, at 1-5.
30. Id. at 2.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 3.
33. Id.
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after her purchase, the Visa shares were trading at $64 a share; the
legislation mysteriously failed to reach the House floor for a vote.34
In September of 2008, also just before a stock market collapse, Treasury
Secretary Hank Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Benjamin Bernanke
held secret meetings with members of Congress about the upcoming
financial collapse. 35 Representative Spencer Bachus was present at the
meetings and made several stock transactions shortly after the meetings,
particularly in General Electric, which yielded significant profits for him. 6
Some members of Congress also made stock transactions while the recent
healthcare legislation" advanced through Congress." John Boehner, who
was the House Minority Leader at the time, fought against the public option
provision in the bill, which would have competed with health insurance
companies, while purchasing shares in various health insurance
companies. 39 The public option was defeated shortly thereafter, and the
value of his purchased shares skyrocketed.40
Recent instances of politicians committing political insider trading are
not confined to the few situations described in the "60 Minutes" report.
Other examples include Senator John Kerry, who made a large profit
trading during the recent health care reform debates.41 During that time, he
purchased $750,000 worth of stock in the company, Teva Pharmaceuticals. 42
Before the health care reform bill passed, he purchased the stock around
$50.43 The value of the stock jumped to $62 after the bill was passed." Also,
Senator Dick Durbin attended meetings with Paulson and Bernanke similar
to those attended by Representative Bachus." After one meeting, Durbin
sold $73,715 the next day to avoid losses that the general public would soon
34. Id.
35. Id. at 1-2.
36. Id.
37. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119
(2010).
38. Kroft, supra note 5, at 2.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. PETER SCHWEIZER, THROW THEM ALL OUT 5-6 (2011).
42. Id. at 5.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 5-6.
45. Id. at 34.
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experience." Senator Durbin, however, also made profitable purchases of
stock during this time.47 Additionally, in 2003, Rahm Emanuel, who sat on
the House Financial Services Committee's Subcommitte on Capital
Markets, Insurance, and Governtment-Sponsored Enterprises, provided
direct oversight for Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae." Days after he sold all of
his Freddie Mac stock that was valued at $250,000, the price dropped 10%.49
Sadly, the few examples listed here are only a small portion of the list of
politicians, on both ends of the political spectrum, who take advantage of
their positions of leadership and the information that those positions
provide. 0
2. Statistics on Political Insider Trading
After conducting a study on the stock market transactions of members of
the United States House and Senate, researchers found that members "trade
with a substantial information advantage."" According to a study done in
2004, United States Senators outperformed the market by approximately
ten percent each year. 2 A follow up study in 2011 found that
Representatives, on average, outperformed the market by six percent each
year." The study also found that Democrats did seven percent better than
Republicans in the market, and those with less seniority substantially
outperformed their senior members.54 The researchers believed this was
because the newer members have the strongest incentive to raise money,
while the senior members, who have had more time to establish themselves,
have little problem raising money at large campaign events." The study was
based on Congress's required annual Financial Disclosure Report, which
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. 36.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 6-8, 60-61, 65-69. Additional politicians who commit political insider trading
include, but are not limited to, the following: Senator Jim Webb, Senator Tom Carper,
Senator Judd Gregg, Representative Jerry Lewis, and Senator Harry Reid. Id. Schweizer
provides a detailed account of the shady transactions that occurred behind closed doors
during the recent healthcare debates and bank bailouts. See generally id.
51. Alan J. Ziobrowski et al., Abnormal Returns from the Common Stock Investments of
Members of the U.S. House of Representatives, 13 Bus. & POL. 1, 5 (2011).
52. Id. at 3.
53. Id. at 5.
54. Id. at 14.
55. Id. at 15.
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reveals information regarding the stock trades of each elected official and
his immediate family.s6 The researchers stated, however, that they were
unable to validate the exactness of the study's results because no
independent, private entity or government agency has examined the
Financial Disclosure Report."
3. "It's Not What You Know..."
Congressional aides also greatly benefit from access to information their
positions provide." In 2008, one of Senator Harry Reid's advisors made
approximately 100% profit on an investment in a firm that directly
benefitted from legislation passed by Senator Harry Reid." Howard
Wolfson worked for Hillary Clinton's presidential campaign in 2008, and he
was able to make exceptionally profitable trades that year.60 He purchased
thousands of dollars in Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac just a few days before
both of the institutions were approved to receive federal aid.6' Based on a
Wall Street Journal study, at least seventy-two aides across both political
parties invested in companies subject to their superiors's oversight.62 Thus,
when it comes to trading on nonpublic information regarding
Congressional activities, the age-old colloquialism rings true: it's not always
what you know, it's who you know.
III. STATES: THE STARTING POINT OF INSIDER-TRADING LAWS
A. The Minority Rule
Before the 1960s, insider trading was regulated exclusively by state law.63
One of the first developments in insider-trading law occurred in the
56. Id. at 2-6.
57. Id. at 6. Due to this lack of accountability and man's sinful human nature, it is not
unreasonable to conclude that many members of Congress failed to disclose some of their
more controversial and highly lucrative trades, which would make these statistics of
outperforming the market even higher.
58. Brody Mullins et al., Congressional Staffers Gain From Trading in Stocks, WALL ST. J. (Oct.
10,2010), http://online.wsj.con/artide/SB10001424052748703431604575522434188603198.html.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. STEPHEN M. BAINBRIDGE, SECURITIES LAW: INSIDER TRADING 7 (2d ed. 2007). The
classic definition of insider trading is as follows: "The use of material, nonpublic information
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Georgia Supreme Court case Oliver v. Oliver.' In Oliver, the court held that
a director of a corporation, who by nature of his position is privy to secret
information, must disclose any information that affects the value of the
stock before transacting with a stockholder." This holding became known
as the duty-to-disclose rule (hereinafter "the minority rule")."
B. The Majority Rule
Before Oliver, directors did not have this obligation under the no-duty
rule (hereinafter "the majority rule")."7 Under the majority rule, directors
were only liable to stockholders for actual fraud-where the director
concealed or misrepresented a material fact during a face-to-face
transaction. 8 In the seminal Massachusetts Supreme Court case of Goodwin
v. Agassiz,69 the court stated that a director with material inside information
does not have a duty to disclose that information in an impersonal stock
exchange because it would be too burdensome on the director.70 The court
noted, however, that the director might owe a duty to disclose under special
circumstances."
In Goodwin, Rodolphe Agassiz, the director of a mining company, knew
of a geologist's theory that valuable minerals were on the company's
property, information of which Homer Goodwin, the plaintiff-stockholder,
was unaware at the time.72 After reading a newspaper article asserting that
the company had concluded its exploratory ventures on that property,
Goodwin sold his shares of the stock." The company, however, was not
responsible for the inaccurate article. Agassiz bought Goodwin's stock,
in trading the shares of a company by a corporate insider or other person who owes a
fiduciary duty to the company." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 866 (9th ed. 2009).
64. Oliver v. Oliver, 45 S.E. 232 (Ga. 1903); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 63, at 9.
65. Oliver, 45 S.E. at 234.
66. The duty-to-disclose rule is the minority approach, which holds that a director has a
duty to disclose material information to a shareholder before conducting the trade. Id.;
BAINBRIDGE, supra note 63, at 9.
67. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 63, at 8. The "no duty rule" is the majority approach. Id.
68. Id.
69. Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659 (Mass. 1933).
70. Id. at 661.
71. Id.; see infra note 86.
72. Goodwin, 186 N.E. at 659.
73. Id. at 660.
74. Id.
282 [Vol. 7:275
THE STOCK ACT IS INADEQUATE
and the stock value increased because the geologist's theory proved
accurate." The court noted that Goodwin, a member of the stock exchange,
was not a novice and had failed to make any inquiries into the company. 6
Furthermore, the court stated that Agassiz's belief in the geologist's theory
was just a hope,n and it would have been detrimental to the company to
disclose the information at that time." Thus, under these circumstances, the
court held that no injustice had been committed and dismissed Goodwin's
claim."
C. Summary of State Insider-Trading Laws
The majority of the states, in their common law, follow the Goodwin
approach, purporting that there is no duty to disclose inside information."o
A few states, however, follow the approach in Oliver, and have held that a
director has an affirmative duty to disclose material, nonpublic
information." Although finding their origin in state law, these state-created
insider-trading rules were significantly changed with the involvement of the
federal government.82 The federal government has essentially taken over
insider-trading regulation, relegating state common law relevance to rare
circumstances when federal regulations do not cover the transaction.
IV. THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S INVOLVEMENT
A. Granting Cert: The United States Supreme Court's First Insider Trading
Case
The Supreme Court first addressed the issue of insider trading in Strong
v. Repide.8 1 In Strong, the Court held that a director does not have a general
75. Id.
76. Id. at 661-62.
77. Id at 661.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 662.
80. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 63, at 8.
81. Id. at 9.
82. Id. at 15.
83. Id.
84. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909); Insider Trading by Congress: Historical Timeline,
PRO CON, http://insidertrading.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=002391 (last updated
Apr. 4,2012, 1:50:43 PM).
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duty to disclose information to stockholders; however, under the particular
facts of this case, the director was found to have a duty to disclose the
material information and, thus, was found guilty of illegal insider trading."
This holding became known as the special circumstances rule 6 and
provides an exception to the majority rule.
The director of the company in Strong was involved in negotiations with
the United States government for the sale of land owned by the company."
Because the sale would greatly affect the value of the company's stock, the
director sent out an agent to purchase shares of the company from Eleanor
Strong, a shareholder. 89 The Court emphasized two important things about
the transaction that proved unacceptable: (1) the defendant concealed his
identity from the shareholder/plaintiff; and (2) the information regarding
the negotiations substantially affected the value of the stock." Much like
Goodwin, Strong provided a possible exception to the majority rule for
special circumstances." Excepting this notable case, the regulations on
insider trading developed without substantial contribution from the United
States Supreme Court for the next seventy years.92
B. Securities Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5
After the stock market crash of 1929, the federal government passed the
1934 Securities Exchange Act-which created the SEC-to restore investor
confidence in the market.93 The general rule regarding securities fraud is
located in Section 10(b)9' of the 1934 Act.95 Approximately eight years later,
85. Strong, 213 U.S. at 433-34.
86. The special circumstances rule provides that under certain circumstances, a director
has a duty to disclose nonpublic material information. Id.; BAINBRIDGE, supra note 63, at 9.
87. The majority rule is that a director does not have a duty to, or a fiduciary
relationship with, the shareholder. Strong, 213 U.S. at 431; BAINBRIDGE,supra note 63, at 8-9.
88. Strong, 213 U.S. at 423-24.
89. Id. at 425.
90. Id. at 432-33.
91. Special circumstances may include a defendant hiding his true identity and material
information. See id. at 433-34; Goodwin v. Agassiz, 186 N.E. 659, 661 (Mass. 1933);
BAINBRIDGE,supra note 60, at 8-14.
92. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 63, at 50.
93. Insider Trading by Congress: Historical Tirneline, supra note 84.
94. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010).
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in 1942, the SEC passed Rule lob-5,"6 which was crafted to resemble, yet
also to improve upon, Section 17(a)17 of the Securities Act of 1933." Rule
lob-5 addressed misstatements and omissions in the previous Act.99 For
example, Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act only applied to the sale of securities,
while Rule lob-5 applies to both sales and purchases.'00 Under Rule 10b-5,
there are five main elements that a plaintiff must prove: "(1) fraud or deceit
(2) by any person (3) in connection with (4) the purchase or sale (5) of any
security."'o' Additionally, since either fraud or deceit is a necessary element,
the common law elements of fraud must also be established in any Rule
lob-5 action-elements such as: "materiality, reliance, causation, and
damages."l0 2
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange ....
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any
security registered on a national securities exchange or any security
not so registered,.. .any manipulative or deceptive device or
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
Id.
95. THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION 442 (6th ed. 2009).
96. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the
purchase or sale of any security.
Id. The reader must be careful not to confuse Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act with Rule 10b-5.
97. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (2012).
98. HAZEN, supra note 95, at 442.
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 445.
102. Id.
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The Commission, however, was ignorant of the importance that the
newly formed rule would have in future litigation."o3 The modern
regulations regarding SEC Rule 10b-5 are "a creature of SEC administrative
actions and judicial opinions, only loosely tied to the statutory language and
its legislative history." 04 Chief Justice William Rehnquist later opined,
"When we deal with private actions under Rule 10b-5, we deal with a
judicial oak which has grown from little more than a legislative acorn."1o
C. Judicial Contribution to Rule 10b-5
1. Disclose or Abstain Rule
In the seminal SEC decision In re Cady, Roberts & Co.,'o6 the SEC
rejected the standard rule that an insider's duty runs only to stockholders
and expanded the duty of the insider to either (1) disclose nonpublic,
material information or (2) abstain from trading (hereinafter "Duty to
Disclose or Abstain") to non-stockholders in the open stock market.'7 In
Cady, Robert Gintel, a broker, tipped his clients to sell stocks on
information that he received from an insider before the information became
public.' J. Cheever Cowdin, the tipper, was present in an important
company meeting, and after agreeing on a major decision that would affect
the value of company shares, the meeting took a recess.'09 While on recess,
Cowdin telephoned Gintel, who then informed his clients."10
The court held that the Duty to Disclose or Abstain consists of two
elements: (1) a relationship, which by its nature allows direct or indirect
access to information intended only for corporate purpose and benefit, and
(2) the inherent unfairness of one party using such information to its
advantage in a transaction against another party without such
information."' Furthermore, the court added that a broker's client cannot
expect to benefit from inside information that the broker possesses when
trading on such information would be to the detriment of the general
103. Id. at 442.
104. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 63, at 29.
105. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
106. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
107. Id. at 911, 913.
108. Id. at 908-10.
109. Id. at 909.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 912.
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public."' Therefore, to protect public investors, Gintel was held to be in
violation of Rule 10b-5, and he was suspended from the stock exchange." 3
2. Material Information
Another major judicial decision regarding Rule 10b-5 is the 1968 case
SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co."' In Texas Gulf the court held that an
insider or anyone else with material inside information has a Duty to
Disclose or Abstain."' Through this decision, the court broadened the
scope of Rule 10b-5 to include anyone trading on nonpublic, material
information."'6 The court further noted that information is material only if
a reasonable investor would consider it material."'
The facts of Texas Gulf are fairly straightforward. The Texas Gulf
Sulphur Company (hereinafter "TGSC") conducted a geographical survey"'
and discovered an area of land that appeared to be rich in minerals."' TGSC
covered up the drill site and told the group working on the drill site to keep
the discovery confidential, even from other TGSC employees.'20 Several of
the individuals involved with the discovery purchased stock in TGSC and
made tips to others.' Despite their best efforts, however, news of the
discovery began to leak out.'22 In response to the rumors, TGSC publicly
announced that it was uncertain whether the land was rich in minerals, and
it needed to continue testing the land.'23 Shortly after that announcement,
TGSC publicly announced the discovery, and then Francis Coates, a TGSC
director, purchased several shares of stock.'24 The court held that the TGSC
employees who traded on the nonpublic information violated Rule 10b-5
for purchasing stock on nonpublic information.'25 It also found Coates in
112. Id. at 916.
113. Id. at 917-18.
114. SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968).
115. Id. at 848.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 848, 862-63.
118. Id. at 843.
119. Id.
120. Id. at 844.
121. Id. at 843-44.
122. Id. at 844-45.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 847.
125. Id. at 856.
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violation of Rule lOb-5 because he purchased the stock before the public
had a reasonable amount of time to learn about the information.126 Thus, by
expanding the duty to anyone with material, nonpublic information, the
court attempted to provide more security for the general public in the stock
market and place investors in an equal position with corporate insiders.127
3. Purchaser or Seller
In the 1975 case Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,128 the Supreme
Court addressed the issue of standing in insider trading actions.129 The
Court held that standing to assert a Rule 1ob-5 action requires a plaintiff to
be either a purchaser or seller of the security that is the subject of the suit.'30
Under a reorganization plan, Blue Chip Stamps (hereinafter "Blue Chip")
was required to offer shares to retailers that used its service in the past.' 3'
The plaintiffs claimed that Blue Chip made intentionally misleading
statements about Blue Chip's status and future earnings estimates.'32 The
Court, however, held that the plaintiffs, who had not purchased the stock,
did not have standing because it would be impossible to refute reliance
without an actual purchase of the stock, and the amount of potential
plaintiffs in Rule lob-5 actions could be endless without such a
requirement.'33
4. Requirement of Deception
Two years after Blue Chip, the Supreme Court heard Santa Fe Industries,
Inc. v. Green.'34 Santa Fe Industries (hereinafter "SFI") owned 95% of the
stock in Kirby Lumber Company and wanted to procure the rest of the
stock to attain complete ownership."' Delaware law contained a statute that
allowed a parent corporation with at least 90% ownership to merge with its
subsidiary, provided that the directors of both corporations agreed, the
parent corporation gave a ten-day notice, and the parent corporation paid
126. Id.
127. Id. at 851-52.
128. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 754-55.
131. Id. at 725-26.
132. Id. at 726.
133. Id. at 761.
134. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
135. Id. at 465.
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cash to the minority of the stockholders for their stocks.136 SFI assessed the
value of the corporation at $125 per share and offered $150 per share to the
stockholders.3 3 Despite SFI's compliance with the Delaware statute,'38 the
plaintiffs claimed: (1) there was no business purpose for the merger other
than more control, and (2) the offered price for the shares was too low,
which constituted fraud under Rule 10b-5.
The Court held that the statutory language of Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act fails to demonstrate congressional intent to prevent
any actions not amounting to manipulation or deception.'" The Court held
that SFI did not act in a manipulative or deceptive manner as alleged in the
complaint because the plaintiffs were fairly informed of the relevant
information and options.'4 ' Therefore, SFI did not violate Section 10(b) or
Rule 10b-5.'42
5. Tippee's Duty to Disclose or Abstain
The Supreme Court made a significant change regarding the application
of Rule 10b-5 in the 1980s with its holding in Dirks v. SEC.'43 Raymond
Dirks worked as an analyst for a New York broker-dealer firm.' He
received a tip from a former officer of Equity Funding of America
(hereinafter "Equity Funding") that Equity Funding was overstating its
assets and committing fraud.'45 The tipper wanted Dirks to verify the
information and expose the fraud.'46 During his investigation of the tip,
Dirks discussed the information with the clients and people he
interviewed."' Although Dirks did not own any shares in Equity Funding,
some of the people he shared information with did, and they sold their
shares based on their discussions with Dirks.' Dirks contacted The Wall
136. Id.
137. Id. at 466.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 468.
140. Id. at 473.
141. Id. at 473-74.
142. Id.
143. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646 (1983); BAINBRIDGE, supra note 63, at 50.
144. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 648.
145. Id. at 649.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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Street Journal to expose the fraud, but The Wall Street Journal declined to
run the story."9 Later, the fraud was exposed and the price of shares
plummeted.so The SEC claimed that Dirks violated Rule 10b-5.'" The
Court held that:
[A] tippee assumes a fiduciary duty to the shareholders of a
corporation not to trade on material nonpublic information only
when the insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing the information to the tippee and the
tippee knows or should know that there has been a breach.'52
The Court further opined that the test for determining whether a tippee is
under a Duty to Disclose or Abstain hinges on whether the tip was a breach
of the insider's fiduciary duty.'53 To determine if the disclosure is a breach,
courts will mainly consider whether the insider personally benefited from
the disclosure.' If an improper purpose is absent, the duty to the
stockholders has not been breached.' 5 If there is no breach by the insider,
then there is no derivative breach by the tippee." 6 Accordingly, Dirks and
the insider did not violate any duty to the shareholder because there was no
improper purpose."' They wanted to expose the fraud.' The changes in
insider trading law that occurred in both Dirks and Chiarella v. United
States"' limited the scope of the Duty to Disclose or Abstain holding of
Texas Gulf '
149. Id. at 649-50.
150. Id. at 650.
151. Id. at 650-51.
152. Id. at 660.
153. Id. at 661.
154. Id. at 662. Personal benefit can be financial, reputational, information, or anything
else that the person values. Id. at 663-64.
155. Id. at 662.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 665-66.
158. Id. at 649.
159. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980); see infra Part IV.C.6.a.
160. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 63, at 50.
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6. The Misappropriation Theory'61
a. The classical theory versus the misappropriation theory
In Chiarella, the defendant, Vincent Chiarella, worked for a printing
firm.'62 He obtained inside information while he worked on documents for
a client of the printing firm.'6' He learned the names of companies involved
in a corporate takeover from the information that was not redacted in the
documents." He bought shares in those companies and made a significant
profit in a short time.165 The SEC investigated and indicted him for violating
Rule 10b-5.'"
The Supreme Court reversed the conviction of Chiaralla under Rule 10b-
5, concluding that he did not have a duty to the shareholders of the
companies targeted for the takeover. 6 Upholding the classical theory, the
Court-limiting the holding from Texas Gulf-held that Chiarella did not
have a relationship of confidence and trust with the shareholders because he
was a mere stranger trading through the impersonal stock market. 68 The
Court distinguished the facts from those of Cady where a relationship of
trust and confidence existed between shareholders and insiders.6' The
Court stated that the formation of such a broad Duty to Disclose or Abstain
for everyone who participates in the stock market would break with the
current requirement of a special relationship; accordingly, it refused to
adopt it in the absence of evidence of congressional intent.o The majority
did not address the misappropriation theory because it was not presented to
the jury. 17
161. The misappropriation theory is a broader than classical insider trading. It is defined
as "the deceitful acquisition and misuse of information that properly belongs to persons to
whom one owes a duty." BLACK's LAW DICTIONARY 866 (9th ed. 2009).
162. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 224.
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 225.
167. Id. at 232-34.
168. Id. at 232-33; SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding
that anyone with nonpublic material information has a duty to abstain from trading or
disclose the information).
169. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
170. Id. at 233.
171. Id. at 236.
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The foundation of the misappropriation theory, however, can be found
in Chief Justice Burger's dissent in Chiarella.7 2 He would have upheld
Chiarella's Rule lob-5 convictions based on the misappropriation theory."
Chief Justice Burger interpreted Rule lob-5 "to mean that a person who has
misappropriated nonpublic information has an absolute duty to disclose
that information or to refrain from trading."17  He noted that Chiarella
knew the information was secret and entrusted to his employer. 17
b. Rule 14e-3: SEC's response to Chiarella
In response to the Supreme Court's decision in Chiarella, the SEC passed
Rule 14e-3 to prevent people who commit acts similar to those in Chiarella
from escaping punishment under insider-trading laws.176 Rule 14e-3
expanded insider-trading laws to "prohibit anyone other than the tender
offeror from trading on the basis of advance information pertaining to a
not-yet-announced tender offer." 77 The validity of Rule 14e-3 was disputed
for exceeding the scope of the SEC's authority, an issue that will be taken up
later in this Comment. 78
c. Adoption of the misappropriation theory and Rule 14e-3
When the issue of the misappropriation theory came before the Supreme
Court again, the Court was split.' According to the misappropriation
theory, the Duty to Disclose or Abstain does not require a relationship with
the company or a direct party to the stock transaction.180 Also, under Rule
lob-5, there was a problem with adopting the misappropriation theory.
Supreme Court precedent established that for a plaintiff to have standing,
he must be a purchaser or seller of the securities in dispute.' The issue
172. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 63, at 99.
173. See Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 239-45 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
174. Id. at 240.
175. Id. at 244.
176. Insider Trading by Congress: Historical Timeline, supra note 84; 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-
3.
177. HAZEN, supra note 95, at 505.
178. See United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642,647 (1997); see also infra Part IV.C.6.c.
179. Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 24 (1987) (holding also that a company's
confidential information is its property).
180. HAZEN, supra note 95, at 499.
181. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 754-55 (holding that a
plaintiff must be a purchaser or seller to have standing); HAZEN, supra note 95, at 500.
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remained unresolved until United States v. O'Hagan,8 2 where the Supreme
Court decided to adopt the misappropriation theory.18 3
In O'Hagan, James O'Hagan was a partner at a law firm.'84 Grand
Metropolitan PLC (hereinafter "Grand Met") hired O'Hagan's firm to
represent it in a potential tender offer for stock in the Pillsbury Company."
O'Hagan did not work on the transaction, and both the firm and Grand
Met took precautions to keep the information confidential.' Despite these
precautions, O'Hagan acquired the information, which he used to make
several purchases of Pillsbury stock.' After Grand Met announced its offer,
Pillsbury's stock value skyrocketed.' O'Hagan sold his stock and made a
profit of $4.3 million."' He later argued trading on the stock was not for
personal gain because he needed the profits to repay money he embezzled
from the firm.'90
The O'Hagan Court discussed the classical theory of insider liability
where a corporate insider trades on corporate, nonpublic information. 9' It
stated that trading on the information qualifies as a deceptive device under
Rule 10(b)'92 because of the relationship of trust and confidence between
shareholders and the insiders of the corporation.'93 Moreover, the Court
added that the misappropriation theory complements the classical theory
because:
The classical theory targets a corporate insider's breach of duty
to shareholders with whom the insider transacts; the
misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of
nonpublic information by a corporate "outsider" in breach of a
182. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651.
183. Id. at 666.
184. Id. at 647.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 648.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 683-84 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
191. Id. at 651-52.
192. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2010).
193. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
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duty owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the
information.14
According to the misappropriation theory, a person commits fraud "in
connection with" a securities transaction, and thereby violates § 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, "when he misappropriates confidential information for
securities trading purposes, in breach of a duty owed to the source of the
information."' The Court also added that the misappropriation theory
seeks to protect the principal from fraudulent misuse of his information by
his fiduciary."' The Court noted, however, that an outsider might escape
liability by fully disclosing his plans to trade on the nonpublic information
to the information's source because the element of deception no longer
exists.'
The O'Hagan Court held that the secret information was the property of
Grand Met, which it entrusted to O'Hagan's firm.'98 Thus, the Court agreed
with the government's contention that O'Hagan breached the duty of trust
and confidence that he owed to the firm and its client.'99 Furthermore, the
O'Hagan Court held that the prohibition against deception in Rule 10b-5 is
not confined to persons who buy or sell the securities, which broadened the
scope of standing.200
The second issue the Court dealt with in O'Hagan was whether the SEC
exceeded its rule-making authority by passing Rule 14e-3. 20 1 The Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals and
approved the validity of Rule 14e-3.202 O'Hagan challenged the validity of
Rule 14e-3 because it did not contain a requirement for a breach of
fiduciary duty.203 The Court held that Rule 14e-3 constitutes a "disclose or
abstain"204 regulation, which authorized the SEC to create reasonably
194. Id. at 652-53.
195. Id. at 652; see 15 U.S.C. § 78)(b) (2010); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2005).
196. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
197. Id. at 655.
198. Id. at 653.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 651.
201. Id. at 649.
202. Id. at 647.
203. Id. at 649.
204. Id. at 669.
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designed rules to prevent fraud.205 Thus, the Court upheld Rule 14e-3 2 0" and
reversed the Eighth Circuit's ruling regarding O'Hagan's Rule 14e-3
violations.207
D. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act
In 2002, Congress passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act208 (hereinafter
"Sarbanes-Oxley") in response to a series of corporate scandals-including
scandals in well-known corporations like Enron, Xerox, Tyco, WorldCom,
and Adelphia-all of which involved several billions of dollars in corporate
fraud.209 The Sarbanes-Oxley reforms made important changes to
regulations regarding public companies. 210 The purpose of Sarbanes-Oxley
was to ensure more accountability for insiders and improve the
communication of a corporation's financial status to its shareholders. 2 11
Sarbanes-Oxley emphasized that a corporation must rapidly disclose any
material changes regarding its financial condition.212 Sarbanes-Oxley also
requires an insider to electronically disclose his trades of the corporation's
stock within two days after they are made.213
V. CONGRESSIONAL RULES ON INSIDER TRADING
A. Congressional Ethics Rules
The rules governing political insider trading are much different than
those governing corporate insiders. For instance, members of the House of
Representatives can be punished for insider trading because it is a violation
of the House Code of Official Conduct.2 14 According to the House Code of
Official Conduct, a member or employee of the House of Representatives
205. Id. at 673.
206. Id. at 676.
207. Id. at 678.
208. Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
209. Insider Trading by Congress: Historical Timeline, supra note 84.
210. HAZEN,supra note 95, at 745.
211. Insider Trading by Congress: Historical Timeline, supra note 84.
212. Id.
213. Id.
214. H. ETHICS MANUAL, 110TH CONG., COMM. ON STANDARDS OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT 3
(Comm. Print 2008), available at http://ethics.house.gov/sites/ethics.house.gov/files/
documents/2008_HouseEthicsManual.pdf.
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"may not receive compensation and may not permit compensation to
accrue to his beneficial interest from any source, the receipt of which would
occur by virtue of influence improperly exerted from his position in
Congress. "215
The House Ethics Manual, which provides guidance on how to abide by
the Code of Official Conduct, adds that a member or employee of the
House of Representatives is prohibited from using his position for personal
* 216gain. The Manual further states that House members and staff should
avoid situations that might cause a reasonable person to draw an inference
of any impropriety.217
On its face, this standard appears to be very high. Nevertheless, a deeper
reading shows that the standard is not really as strict as it purports to be. A
confusing tension exists between the several regulations and exceptions.
When discussing the Financial Disclosure Reports, the Manual states, "No
federal statute, regulation, or rule of the House absolutely prohibits a
Member or House employee from holding assets that might conflict with or
influence the performance of official duties."218 Unlike corporate insiders,219
members of Congress are only required to make a financial disclosure once
per year. 220 These financial disclosures must include "investments, income,
and liabilities."22 1 Investments under $1,000 simply do not need to be
disclosed at all.222 Also, in a "rare instance" when a member of Congress has
a direct personal conflict with the subject matter to be voted on, that
member is required to abstain from voting.223 Direct personal conflicts are
determined by the House Standards Committee on a case-by-case basis. 224
The Manual also provides that members are not required to report
everything, and they are also not "expected to fully strip themselves of
215. CODE OF OFFICIAL CONDUCT, 112TH CONG., H. COMM. ON ETHICS RULE XXIII
(Comm. Print 2011), available at http://ethics.house.gov/publication/code-official-conduct.
216. H. ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 214, at 186.
217. Id.
218. Id. at 248.
219. Insider Trading by Congress: Historical Timeline, supra note 84. Corporate insiders
must disclose within two days. Id.
220. Id.; Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824 (1978).
221. H. ETHICS MANUAL, supra note 214, at 249.
222. Id. at 257.
223. Id. at 250.
224. Id. at 249, 251.
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worldly goods."2 5 The financial disclosure policy only requires the
reporting of what is relevant to a "potential conflict of interest."226 If the
financial information is too private or burdensome to be retrieved, then
members are not required to disclose it.227 Generally, the financial
information belonging to spouses and dependents of members of Congress
must also be disclosed-there is an exception, however, to this general
provision. 228 The House Standards Committee then reviews the financial
information that the members of Congress provide. 229 Also, members of
Congress always have the option to transfer their assets to a blind trust and
take advantage of the fact that assets placed in blind trusts do not have to be
reported.230 The strict remedy recommended by this Comment would
eliminate the confusion created by the series of regulations and exceptions
in the House Code of Official Conduct, and it would no longer allow the
House to self-discipline itself by granting that power to the SEC.
B. Why Insider- Trading Laws Do Not Apply to Congress
As mentioned previously, insider-trading laws currently do not apply to
members of Congress. 231 In fact, insider-trading laws have never been
applied to members of Congress.232 Members of Congress can, and do,
225. Id. at 250.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 253. The exception to the spouse and dependent disclosure policy is only
applicable:
when the financial interest of a spouse or dependent child meets all three
standards listed below, may a filer omit disclosure of an asset:
(1) The item is the sole interest or responsibility of the spouse or dependent
child, and the reporting individual has no knowledge of the item;
(2) The item was not in any way, past or present, derived from the income,
assets, or activities of the reporting individual; and
(3) The reporting individual neither derives, nor expects to derive, any
financial or economic benefit from the item.
Id.
229. Id. at 252.
230. Ethics in Government Act Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, § 102(e), 92 Stat. 1824
(1978); SCHWEIZERsupra note 41, at 169.
231. See supra Part I.
232. Aruna Viswanatha, SEC Warns on Congressional Insider Trading Ban, REUTERS
(Dec. 6, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/12/06/us-sec-insider-trading-
idUSTRE7B520320111206.
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freely trade on "nonpublic current or upcoming congressional activity."233
To understand how current insider-trading laws do not apply to members
of Congress, it is helpful to consider instances of political insider trading as
applied to the classical theory,234  tipper/tippee liability,2 5  and the
misappropriation theory. 6
1. Political Insider Trading Applied to the Classical Theory
To fully analyze this issue, a review of the classical theory is essential.
Once again, under the classical theory, a Rule 10b-5 conviction requires a
corporate insider, who obtained confidential information solely by reason
of his position, to trade on that nonpublic information while having an
existing relationship of trust and confidence with a corporation's
shareholders.238 Thus, the relationship creates the Duty to Disclose or
Abstain.239 Furthermore, this theory "applies not only to officers, directors,
and other permanent insiders of a corporation, but also to attorneys,
accountants, consultants, and others who temporarily become fiduciaries of
a corporation." 240
In Representative Bachus's situation,241' he made several stock
transactions based upon nonpublic information that he learned of
immediately prior to the stock market collapse during his meeting with
Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson and Federal Reserve Chairman Benjamin
Bernanke.242 Here, Representative Bachus does not have the requisite
relationship of trust and confidence with the shareholders of the
corporations in which he traded because he did not gain that information
by nature of being a corporate insider or fiduciary of those corporations.
Like the situation in Chiarella, Representative Bachus is a corporate
233. David Callahan, Myths and Facts on Congressional Insider Trading, CHEATING
CULTURE (Dec. 17, 2011, 12:09 PM), http://www.cheatingculture.com/insider-
trading/2011/12/17/myths-and-facts-on-congressional-insider-trading.html.
234. See infra Part V.B.1.
235. See infra Part V.B.2.
236. See infra Part V.B.3.
237. See supra Part IV.C.6.a. (defining the classical theory).
238. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 641, 651 (1997); Chiarella v. United States, 445
U.S. 222, 228 (1980).
239. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651; Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228-29.
240. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651; Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,655 n.14 (1983).
241. See supra Part II.B.1 (presenting the Representative Bachus scenario).
242. Kroft, supra note 5, at 2.
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outsider"' who gained the nonpublic information through a government
meeting on market intelligence.2 Moreover, unlike Chiarella,
Representative Bachus is not an employee of a corporation that serves the
client who owns the nonpublic information.245 Thus, just as the classical
theory did not apply to Chiarella, it will not apply to Representative
Bachus's situation.
In former Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's scenario,246 she bought
shares of stock in a company that would be negatively affected by legislation
being proposed in the House-of which she was the leader and member of
the controlling party.247 Coincidentally, the legislation failed shortly after
her purchases.248 Here, the nonpublic information was gained by her
position as Speaker of the House, not as a corporate insider. As Speaker of
the House, she was in the position to know whether the legislation would be
successful because the House polls members of Congress to determine the
outcome of legislation.24 9 Furthermore, it is very possible that even the
corporate insiders of the company with which she traded were unaware that
the legislation would not pass. Thus, under the classical theory, it would be
impossible to convict former House Speaker Pelosi because she did not gain
the nonpublic information that she traded on by virtue of being a corporate
insider or fiduciary; therefore, no relationship of trust or confidence
between shareholders and corporate insiders would be breached. This
would be true, even if she was not the Speaker of the House but simply
knew the status of the legislation by virtue of her position as a member of
the House. The breach of trust and confidence that occurs between a
member of Congress and an American citizen during such instances of
political insider-trading should be a violation of insider-trading laws, but, as
displayed under the classical theory, it is not.
243. Id.
244. Id.
245. Chiarella, 45 U.S. at 224.
246. See supra Part II.B.1 (presenting the Speaker of the House Nancy Pelosi's scenario).
247. Id. at 2-3.
248. Id. at 3.
249. Christopher Beam, Cool Whip: What Does a Congressional "Whip" Actually Do?,
SLATE (Mar. 3, 2010, 5:18 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and-politics/explainer
/2010/03/cool-whip.html.
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2. Political Insider Trading Applied to Tipper/Tippee Liability
According to tipper/tippee liability, the tippee takes on a fiduciary duty
to the shareholders of the corporation.25 0 That duty is to refrain from
trading on material, nonpublic information.251' The duty is required only
when the corporate insider has breached his fiduciary duty to the
shareholders by disclosing such information to the tippee, and the tippee
knows or should know that the tipper breached that duty.25 2 Again, the test
for whether there has been a breach is whether the tipper personally
benefits from the disclosure.253
In a tipper/tippee analysis, the first thing to consider is whether a
corporate insider has breached his fiduciary duties. 254 Representative
Bachus received his information from Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson
and Federal Reserve Chairman Benjamin Bernanke, neither of which were
corporate insiders. 255 Thus, Paulson and Bernanke did not breach any duty
to any shareholders by disclosing the information. Furthermore, they did
not achieve any personal benefit from the financial disclosure. They were
merely doing their respective jobs to warn Congress about the upcoming
financial collapse.256 So, here, Representative Bachus will escape
tipper/tippee liability because he had no fiduciary duty to refrain from
disclosing any information to any shareholders. There was also no
improper purpose for the tipper's disclosure, and thus, there is no breach.
The same is true for former House Speaker Nancy Pelosi. No corporate
insider personally benefited or breached any fiduciary duty to corporate
shareholders by informing her of the information affecting Visa's stock.257
She knew this information because of her position as House Speaker. 258 The
elements of tipper/tippee liability are once again not present because there
was no duty to corporate shareholders owed by the corporate insider-the
tipper. Thus, another set of current insider-trading laws has failed to
capture the circumstances that are involved in political insider trading.
250. Dirks v. SEC, 463 U.S. 646,647 (1983).
251. Id.
252. Id.
253. Id. at 662. See supra Part IV.C.5 (stating that a personal benefit can be financial,
reputational, informational, or anything else that a person values).
254. Id. at 659-65.
255. Kroft, supra note 5, at 2.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 2-3.
258. Id.
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3. Political Insider Trading Applied to the Misappropriation Theory
Because members of Congress can escape punishment under the classical
theory and under tipper/tippee liability, an examination of the
misappropriation theory, which is broader, applies to the previous
situations. As discussed earlier, a Rule 10b-5 conviction under the
misappropriation theory requires a corporate outsider to trade on
nonpublic information in breach of the Duty to Disclose or Abstain owed to
the source of information.259 The misappropriation theory protects the
principal against his fiduciary's fraudulent misuse of his information.260 if,
however, the outsider fully discloses to the source of the information that he
intends to trade on that information, there is no breach of the Duty to
Disclose or Abstain. In this situation, the outsider escapes liability because
the requisite element of deception no longer exists.261
In Representative Bachus's situation, Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson
and Federal Reserve Chairman Benjamin Bernanke were the sources of
Representative Bachus's nonpublic information.262 They gained the
nonpublic information through their government positions by researching
the nation's economy and being privy to information only accessible to
those in their positions, or other similar ones.263 These facts are unlike the
facts in O'Hagan where the source of the information was O'Hagan's
employer, which owed the Duty to Disclose or Abstain to its client-the
corporation that owned the nonpublic information.2" Thus, in
Representative Bachus's situation, there was no corporate "owner" of
property rights in information. Rather, information was gathered through
government research to which Represenative Bachus was granted access via
his position. Additionally, unlike O'Hagan, Treasury Secretary Paulson and
Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke were not Representative Bachus's
principals, and as a member of Congress, Representative Bachus was not
259. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 652-53 (1997).
260. Id. at 652.
261. Id. at 655.
262. Kroft, supra note 5.
263. History & Society: Federal Reserve System, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/203437/Federal-Reserve-System (last visited
Apr. 18, 2013); History & Society: United States Department of the Treasury (United States
Government), ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/
topic/603749/US-Department-of-the-Treasury (last visited Apr. 18, 2013).
264. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653.
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their fiduciary.265 They did not employ Representative Bachus, and he did
not owe them a duty of loyalty. Members of Congress do have general
fiduciary duties to the people that they represent; however, the
misappropriation theory requires a fiduciary duty to the specific source of
the information. 266 Thus, this general fiduciary duty that a representative
owes to the general public, which was not the specific source of
information, is too vague, derivative, and broad to properly capture the
intent required by the misappropriation.267
The misappropriation theory would also allow former House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi to escape liability for similar reasons. As Speaker of the House,
her position was her source of information regarding the status of the
proposed legislation that negatively affected a company in which she owned
stock. Thus, she is not violating any duty to the source of information. Like
Representative Bachus, her only fiduciary duty is a general duty to the
electorate, 268 and the electorate was not the source of the information on
which she traded.
Furthermore, hypothetically, under the misappropriation theory, a
member of Congress could receive information by a corporate insider who
wants to gain legislative favor and legally trade on that information, as long
as that member disclosed their plans to trade on that information to the
insider. As a former SEC official declared, members of Congress are "not
breaching a duty of confidentiality to anybody and therefore [they] would
not be liable for insider trading."269 Though some in the legal community
may claim that the current laws are sufficient,270 the language of Supreme
Court precedents coupled with the fact that insider-trading laws have not
been applied to members of Congress-despite its practice being committed
since the founding of America-strongly reinforces the assertion that the
265. Id. at 647-54.
266. Stephen M. Bainbridge, Insider Trading Inside the Beltway, 36 J. CoRP. L. 281, 295
(2011).
267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id at 296; Peter Lattman, Bill Looks to Ban Insider Trading for Lawmakers and Their
Aides, WSJ BLOG (Mar. 28, 2006, 8:58 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2006/03/28/bill-looks-
to-ban-insider-trading-for-lawmakers-and-their-aides/.
270. Andrew George, Comment, Public (Self)-Service: Illegal Trading on Confidential
Congressional Information, 2 HARV. L. & POL'Y REv. 161, 170 (2008); Donna M. Nagy, Insider
Trading, Congressional Officials, and Duties of Entrustment, 91 B.U. L. REv. 1105, 1163
(2011).
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current insider-trading laws do not apply to them. Thus, a clear statute
addressing the issue is required.
C. The STOCK Act2"
The STOCK Act prohibits members of Congress from trading on
nonpublic information obtained by reason of their position.272 Also, instead
of disclosing trades every year, the STOCK Act provides that members of
Congress must disclose trades of stock within ninety days of the trade. 27 3
The STOCK Act applies not only to Congress, but also to all federal
employees and all people receiving nonpublic information while knowing
that the tipper obtained such information by reason of his position in the
federal government. 274
The largest section of the STOCK Act, however, includes regulations that
require disclosure of political intelligence activities under the Lobbying
Disclosure Act.2 ' The government does not presently regulate political
intelligence activities. 276 Political intelligence is a $100 million per year
industry that uses members of Congress and former staff members to
obtain valuable, nonpublic information to sell to investors.277 Currently, the
STOCK Act's future approval appears uncertain. Nevertheless, as discussed
later in this Comment, even if the Act is approved, it still does not
adequately address the problem of political insider trading. 27 8
In past years, a handful of representatives have unsuccessfully attempted
to pass the STOCK Act on multiple occasions. 279 The STOCK Act has been
introduced three times but has never made it out of a committee. 28 0 A recent
"60 Minutes" report, however, brought significant attention to the problem
of political insider trading, causing the STOCK Act to be reintroduced.281
271. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, supra note 24.
272. Id. § 2(d).
273. Id. § 5(a).
274. Id. § 2(e).
275. Id. § 6.
276. Kroft, supra note 5, at 7.
277. Id.
278. See infra Part VII.B.
279. What is the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, PRO CON,
http://insidertrading.procon.org/view.resource.php?resourcelD=004520 (last updated Dec.
15, 2011, 2:13 PM).
280. Id.
28 1. Id.
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Currently, support for the Act seems to be substantially increasing in
response to the "60 Minutes" report.282 House Majority Leader Eric Cantor,
however, stopped progress of the STOCK Act in 2011, which had 237 co-
sponsors, and promised instead to expand and build upon it in the spring.28 3
VI. WHY IS POLITICAL INSIDER TRADING WRONG?
Before the American people can demand that a statute be written to
prohibit insider-trading, it is important to wrestle with the question of
whether insider trading is wrong, and if so, why it is wrong. First, law and
economics arguments regarding political insider trading must be
considered because it is a popular view among many American legal
scholars, especially those in the area of securities. Next, in discussing the
morality of political insider trading, it is also extremely relevant to reflect on
what Christianity, a predominant religion,284 says about the practice.
A. Law and Economics Perspective
Law and economics presupposes that the market is more efficient at
regulating society than the government.2 85 Man is considered a rational
maximizer, working to increase his own satisfactions, and the government's
role in the economy is to offer man incentives to achieve outcomes that it
282. Id.
283. Seung Min Kim, Eric Cantor Pledges to Expand the STOCK Act, PoLITICO (Dec. 16,
2011, 7:47 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1211/70581.html. At the time this
Comment was submitted, the United States Senate approved the STOCK Act by a vote of
96-3, which then sent it to Congress for review, debate, and approval. Abby Ohlheiser,
STOCK Act Sails Through the Senate, SLATE (Feb. 3, 2012),
http://slatest.slate.com/posts/2012/02/03/stock-actaimstoban-insiderjtradingin-congr
ess.html. Congress passed the STOCK Act, but as this Comment recommended, it voted to
drop the political intelligence disclosure requirements. Associated Press, House Passes
Insider-Trading Bill, Fox NEWS (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2012/
02/09/housepasses-insider-trading-bill/. The changes will require a Senate and House
conference for a debate and vote. Id.
284. Richard Allen Greene, Christianity Goes Global As World's Largest Religion, ABC
NEWS (Dec. 19, 2011), http://www.abc2news.com/dpp/news/national/christianity-goes-
global-as-worlds-largest-religion.
285. History d- Society: Law and Economics, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/178548/economics/236779/Law-and-
economics (last visited Dec. 21, 2011).
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deems proper.286 Judge Richard Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals,287 largely responsible for bringing a law and economics analysis to
American jurisprudence, advocates that laws are-or should be-
efficient.288
There is a split, however, in the law and economics community about
whether insider-trading is actually economically efficient. 289 Some law and
economics advocates argue that insider trading is a good thing because it is
an efficient way to disclose the actual price of a stock sooner. 29 0 These
advocates claim that it also decreases the need for whistle blowers because if
a corporation is committing fraud, then all one needs to do is watch for
insiders selling their personal stocks in the corporation.291' Another
argument against a prohibition on insider trading is that abstention from
trading can be a form of insider trading, which is impossible to catch.292
Furthermore, insider trading is an efficient way to compensate employees
for their work and new ideas.293
Some economic theories, however, dispute the efficiency of allowing
insider trading and advocate that insider trading should be regulated.294
Others hold that trading at the wrong price harms the investor.295 Another
economic argument against insider trading focuses on the harms it places
on the corporation by creating an incentive for corporate employees to
delay sharing information with their bosses.296 Additionally, in merger
transactions, insiders could harm the corporation by increasing the price of
286. RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 2-4 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. eds.,
6th ed. 2003).
287. Contact Information, UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS: SEVENTH CIRCUIT,
http://www.ca7.uscourts.gov/contact.htm#posner (last updated Oct. 17, 2011).
288. The Economic Analysis of Law, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Aug. 12,
2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/legal-econanalysis/.
289. Alan Strudler & Eric W. Orts, Moral Principle in the Law of Insider Trading, 78 TEX.
L. REV. 375, 382-83 (1999).
290. Donald J. Boudreaux, Insider Trading Prohibitions Should go out of Style, THE FUTURE OF
FREEDOM FOUNDATION (Jun. 6,2003), http://www.ff.org/comment/com0306f.asp.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. BAINBRIDGE, supra note 63, at 144-47.
294. Id. at 159-81.
295. Id. at 158-66.
296. Id. at 166-68.
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the target corporation by purchasing stock in that corporation before the
merger.297
When questioning whether political insider trading is harmful, the law
and economics analysis changes because members of Congress do not
create profit-making information, but rather, are simply in a position to
receive it.298 Thus, the incentive to allow insider trading to increase
efficiency in the market is nonexistent.299 Furthermore, allowing politicians
to trade on material, nonpublic information could give them additional
reasons to attack certain businesses,300 manipulate the legislative process,
and engage in a form of bribery.301' Thus, economically, it does not make
sense to allow members of Congress to commit insider trading.
B. Biblical Perspective
Trading on nonpublic information in the stock market is, of course, not
mentioned in the Bible because the stock market did not exist in
antiquity.3 02 One can, however, deduce from Scriptures that the practice of
insider trading is morally wrong and should be prohibited, especially for a
person in a position of leadership.
The main theme of the Bible is to love God and to love others.30 3 Jesus
Christ teaches that one should treat others the way he wishes to be
treated.'" Most people do not want to be intentionally misled in a financial
transaction by insiders with nonpublic information. Thus, according to
Christ's teachings, insiders should not purposefully take advantage of those
in an inferior position. Continuing the theme of not taking advantage of
others in business transactions, the Bible states, "unequal weights are an
abomination to the Lord."30 s God also curses the man who leads a blind
297. Id. at 168-72.
298. Bainbridge, supra note 266, at 299.
299. Id.
300. Larry E. Ribstein, Congressmen As Securities Traders, 14 GREEN BAG 2d 269, 270
(2011).
301. Bainbridge, supra note 266, at 299-300.
302. The Birth of Stock Exchanges, INVESTOPEDIA (Oct. 25, 2007),
http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/stock-exchange-history.asp#axzzlhHfssqMn.
303. Matthew 22:36-40 (English Standard Version) (all subsequent citations to Scripture
are to the ESV).
304. Matthew 7:12.
305. Proverbs 20:23.
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man astray.3 06 In the situation of insider trading, one party is blind to the
material nonpublic information, while the other deceptively acts as if the
price is fair. It can also be deduced that financial disclosure is a biblical
practice because the Bible teaches that one should act in the light, and that
one's sins will be revealed.o' Furthermore, the Bible also teaches that sin
and corruption grow in the darkness.30 s 8
Regarding leaders, the Bible teaches that they should administer justice
and not show partiality, exact gifts, or accept bribes.30 ' When leaders forsake
such instructions, ruin will inevitably follow.310 Furthermore, the Bible
teaches that leaders should be above reproach, and thus, be held to a higher
standard than the people the leader oversees."' Consequently, according to
a biblical perspective, it logically flows that members of Congress should be
held to an even higher standard than mere businessmen.
VII. WHAT NEEDS TO BE DONE TO STOP IT?
A. Why Can't the States Pass Laws to Address the Issue?
While states would be the most financially independent overseer of
Congress, state oversight currently is not a viable option for regulating
members of Congress trading on nonpublic information. As mentioned
previously, the federal government has largely taken over regulation of
insider trading.312 Additionally, America's Founders did not want states to
have the power to determine the qualifications of members of the House of
Representatives because they wanted uniformity in those qualifications.313
The Founders feared that the federal government would be at the mercy of
the states if the states had the power to include or exclude who could hold
office in the House of Representatives." The federal power to determine
the qualifications for House members was balanced against the states's
306. Deuteronomy 27:18.
307. 1 Corinthians 4:5; 2 Corinthians 4:2-6; Job 12:22; Proverbs 28:13; 1 Thessalonians
5:5-8.
308. Isaiah 29:15-16; Job 24:13-17.
309. Deuteronomy 16:19; Isaiah 1:23; Proverbs 29:4.
310. Proverbs 29:4.
311. 1 Timothy 3:2; Titus 1:7-14.
312. See supra Part IV.
313. THE FEDERALIST No. 52, at 273 (James Madison) (The Gideon ed., 2001).
314. THE FEDERALIST No.59, at 307 (Alexander Hamilton) (The Gideon ed., 2001).
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interest in that they were vested with the authority to appoint members in
the Senate.315
Touching on this issue specifically, the Supreme Court held in U.S. Term
Limits v. Thornton 316 that states could not require additional qualifications
for members of the House of Representatives or Senate." The Court
reasoned that the reserved state powers protected by the Tenth Amendment
did not include the power to add requirements to membership in the House
and Senate.3" The Court added that any state provision adding
qualifications or restrictions beyond those enumerated in the Constitution
is unconstitutional. 319 Thus, it is highly unlikely that the Court would allow
states to enact provisions requiring their representatives to disclose
financial transactions or abstain from trading on nonpublic information. It
should be noted, however, that in the dissent in Thornton, four Justices
supported the notion that nothing in the Constitution prevented the states
from adding such qualifications.320 Consequently, if the issue comes before
the Court again, the result might be different depending on the current
Court's willingness to distinguish or adhere to Thornton.32'
B. Why Not Adopt the STOCK Act?
As discussed previously, there is currently no law addressing members of
Congress trading on nonpublic information regarding market changing
legislation.322 By default, the STOCK Act is a step in the right direction,
however, as currently drafted, the Act is anemic. Like many congressional
actions, passing the Act is similar to placing a small bandage on a bullet
wound. The Act is too watered down to adequately remedy such a corrupt
and widespread practice that has plagued our government for over 200
years.
315. Id. at 307-10; U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 3, cl. 1, amended by U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVII.
316. U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
317. Id. at 783.
318. Id. at 802.
319. Id. at 836.
320. Id. at 845.
321. See generally Benjamin S. Walton, Note, U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton: Who
Are the People and Why Does It Matter?, 4 LIBERTY U. L. REV. 173 (2009). This Note further
discusses whether states have reserved powers to limit the federal government according to
the founders. Id.
322. See supra Part V.
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1. Why so Long a Period Before Disclosing?
One major problem with the Act is that it grants members of Congress
ninety days before they are required to disclose a stock transaction.323 Why
are members of Congress, our nation's leaders, granted ninety days, while
corporate insiders must report within two days?3 24 A two-day disclosure
period for corporate insiders is both reasonable and necessary, and if any
group is to be held to a higher standard, it should be Congress. When major
legislation is being proposed and voted on, the American people want to
know that their leaders are acting in the best interest of the country, not
lining their own pockets. Trust in Congress is at an all-time low; the people
of America are sick of the behavior of those in Congress, 325 and requiring a
much shorter financial disclosure period might be one step toward a
remedy. Furthermore, the electorate is being robbed of the chance to voice
its concern to its representatives about legislation that it thinks is being
passed for corrupt purposes. After three months, the passage of the
legislation is ancient history with our fast-paced and short-attention-
spanned society,326 and all of the underhanded transactions that occurred
during that time are nowhere near as meaningful because little can be done
about it so long afterwards.
If there is going to be a disclosure period, why not require members of
Congress to disclose new transactions instantaneously? In a world of
iPhones, Blackberries, and email, members of Congress can simply disclose
the transaction minutes after it has been completed. A 24-hour disclosure
requirement would be better because the nation would be updated on
possible conflicts on important legislation immediately. It would also allow
them time to gather their information and fill out forms during a
demanding schedule.
323. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, supra note 24, § 5(a).
324. 15 U.S.C. § 78p(a)(2)(C) (2010).
325. Kilstein, supra note 1.
326. David Marcovitz, Point/Counterpoint is Educational Technology Shortening Student
Attention Spans?, INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY FOR TECHNOLOGY IN EDUCATION (Aug. 8, 2012,
13:36 PM), http://www.iste.org/learn/publications/learning-leading/issues/august-
2008/point-counterpoint-is-educational-technology-shortening-student-attention -spans-.
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2. What Makes $1,000 a Magical Number?
Another problem with the Act is that members of Congress do not have
to report any financial transactions under $1,000.327 As evidenced by
Senator Clinton, a savvy and well-connected politician can turn a small
investment of $1,000 into a $100,000 in a matter of months.3 28 Under the
Act, she would have been able to purchase $999.99 in stock and have a
similar profit within the same short time frame without having to make the
initial ninety-day disclosure. In effect, this $1,000 limitation serves no
purpose, and must be eliminated.
3. Put the Political Intelligence Section in a Separate Bill to Gain
Support
Also, while the political intelligence section in the Act is adequate, it may
be more effective to address that issue in a separate piece of legislation to
gather more support to address the issue of political insider trading. As
discussed earlier, political intelligence is another corrupt form of political
insider trading because it consists of former members of Congress or their
staff using their connections to gain nonpublic information to sell to
investors.3 29 The Act would properly require political intelligence firms and
consultants to register with Congress just as lobbyists are required to
register.330 Undoubtedly, this additional step toward increased disclosure on
the practices in Congress would be beneficial, but an incremental approach
regarding this effort may prove more effective, particularly considering the
resistance this Act has already received.' Sometimes, taking one small step
forward by addressing one issue at a time is more successful than
attempting to address several issues at once. Thus, advocates for the Act
should also strongly consider an alternative strategy to pass the Act by
separating Section 6, regarding political intelligence, into a different Act. By
327. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, supra note 24, at § 5(a).
328. Mark Hosenball & Eleanor Clift, Hillary's Adventures in Cattle Futures Land, THE
DAILY BEAST (Apr. 10, 1994, 8:00 PM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek
/1994/04/10/hillary-s-adventures-in-cattle-futures-land.html. Before Senator Hillary Clinton
took office, she turned an investment of $1,000 into $100,000 in nine months during the
time President Bill Clinton was governor of Arkansas. Id. She traded on the advice of brokers
who were later found to have violated unrelated trading rules. Id.
329. See supra Part V.C.; see also Kroft, supra note 5, at 5.
330. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, supra note 24, § 6.
331. What is the Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, supra note 279.
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doing this, advocates for the Act may be able to pick up more votes and
more media attention, which could lead to a better chance of success.
4. Why Allow a Bias toward Certain Companies?
Finally, the Act still allows too much freedom for members of Congress
to make investments in individual companies while they consider market-
changing legislation. The STOCK Act generally states that members are
prohibited from trading on nonpublic information, and all transactions
over $1,000 need to be disclosed.332 Members can own stock in a company
like IBM, before drafting market-changing legislation, and later vote on
legislation that benefits individual companies like IBM-or whatever
company they own stock in. This allows too much of a conflict of interest
and is a form of insider trading because members of Congress may abstain
from selling while they are aware of the effects of market-changing
legislation on individual companies. The purposeful act of favoring certain
companies and industries over others just to benefit a personal stock
portfolio is an extremely corrupt practice and has the potential to negatively
affect millions. To prevent this, additional safeguards are necessary. A more
strict and comprehensive approach is needed to adequately tackle this
corrupt motivation.
C. Other Insufficient Proposed Solutions
Some in the legal community have advocated for blind trusts to solve this
problem.333 A blind trust exists when a trustee handles the investments and
the owner does not know what stocks he holds.334 The problem, however,
with blind trusts is that the investments do not need to be disclosed335 and
by their nature are secret. As mentioned earlier, shining light on people's
conduct is a great deterrent of corrupt practices.336 It is also hard to enforce
a prohibition against communicating with the trustee of the trust, especially
332. Stop Trading on Congressional Knowledge Act, supra note 24, §§ 1-7.
333. Bud W. Jerke, Comment, Cashing in on Capitol Hill: Insider Trading and the Use of
Political Intelligence For Profit, 158 U. PA. L. REv. 1451, 1513-17 (2010).
334. Blind Trust, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/terms/b/blindtrust.asp#ax
zzliVQXEBgb (last visited Jan. 5, 2012).
335. Ethics in Government Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-521, 92 Stat. 1824, § 102(e)
(1978).
336. See supra Part VI.B.
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because the settlor chooses the trustee.337 These flaws prevent the blind trust
from stepping in as a viable solution to the political insider trading
problem.
Others advocate that the insider-trading laws are sufficient as they are-
the problem lying only in their enforcement.338 This assertion has already
been addressed in this Comment and is simply not true; the laws, as they
currently stand, do not apply in political insider trading.339 The fact that
there has never been a conviction of a member of Congress for trading on
nonpublic information regarding congressional activity3 40 supports the
notion that those advocating the sufficiency in the current laws are in error.
Some in the legal community advocate for the passage of the STOCK Act
with some modifications, such as shortening the disclosure requirements. 341
Under the STOCK Act, members would still be able to invest in individual
companies and be aware of those individual holdings, which could easily
influence their legislative policies. While passing the STOCK Act is at least a
step in the right direction, a more stringent bright-line requirement is
necessary to ensure that this type of fraud committed by our nation's
leaders ends.
D. Provisions That Should Be Adopted to Adequately Address The Problem
1. Mandatory Investment in U.S. Index Funds
A statute that adequately addresses political insider trading would
require members of Congress to invest only in index funds based on the
United States economy, which would provide a clear bright-line standard to
enforce. This rule would apply to the following types of investments: stocks,
grantor trusts, blind trusts, bonds, hedge funds, options, IPOs, and mutual
337. SCHWEIZER, supra note 41, at 168-69 (evidencing how politicians put their money in
blind trusts and still get away with political insider trading because they communicate the
nonpublic information to their trustee).
338. George, supra note 270, at 170; Nagy, supra note 270, at 1149-51.
339. See supra Part V.B.
340. Viswanatha, supra note 232. At the time of this Comment's submission, an
investigation began regarding Representative Bachus's trades during the financial collapse in
2008, and if he is convicted, it will be interesting to see what laws the government uses to
convict him. Scott Higham & Dan Keating, Rep. Spencer Bachus Faces Insider-Trading
Investigation, WASH. PosT (Feb. 9, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/rep-
bachus-faces-insider-trading-investigation/2012/02/09/gIQA21Ui2Q-print.html.
341. Bainbridge, supra note 266, at 307; Matthew Barbabella et al., Insider Trading in
Congress: The Need For Regulation, 9 J. Bus. & SEC. L. 199, 235-37 (2009).
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funds.342 Thus, if a member of Congres owns one of the covered
investments, he or she will be required to transfer that amount in the
authorized index funds that are based on the U.S. economy. An index fund
is a category of mutual funds.43 that complements or follows a market
index.3'" The DJIA, S&P 500, and Nasdaq are all common U.S. indices in
which one can invest.34 s The DJIA consists of thirty of the largest companies
located in the United States."' The S&P 500 represents 500 large companies
throughout important sections of the U.S. economy," and the Nasdaq
Composite Index consists of the 100 largest nonfinancial companies such as
internet and technological stocks.348 To adequately address the problem of
insider trading, all members of Congress should have to proportionally
transfer all of the covered investments evenly into these three indexes two
weeks before being sworn into office and be required to only invest
proportionally in these index funds while serving in office. Thus, two weeks
before being sworn into office, each member's total covered investments
should be divided by three, and placed proportionately into the DJIA index
fund, the S&P 500 index fund, and the Nasdaq index fund. Two years after
leaving office, the former member of Congress should be allowed to transfer
their funds freely into their choice of stock.
A statute such as this would make it extremely difficult for members of
Congress to favor one industry or company over another for personal
financial gain. Also, their investments would be so dependent on the well
being of all sectors of the United States economy that favoritism for
342. Investments in land, commodities, and personal or family businesses will be
excluded from this rule. The SEC, however, will monitor these investments to ensure that
there is not a conflict of interest.
343. Mutual Funds: What Are They?, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
university/mutualfunds/mutualfunds.asp#axzzliVQXEBgb (last visited Jan. 4, 2012).
344. Index Investing: Index Funds, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
university/indexes/index8.asp#axzzliVQXEBgb (last visited Jan. 5, 2012).
345. Index Investing: Introduction, INVESTOPEDIA, http://www.investopedia.com/
university/indexes/default.asp#axzzliVQXEBgb (last visited Jan. 5,2012).
346. Index Investing: The Dow Jones Industrial Average, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/indexes/index2.asp#axzzliVQXEBgb (last visited
Jan. 4, 2012).
347. Index Investing: The Standard & Poor's 500 Index, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/indexes/index3.asp#axzzliVQXEBgb (last visited
Jan. 4, 2012).
348. Index Investing: The Nasdaq Composite Index, INVESTOPEDIA,
http://www.investopedia.com/university/indexes/index4.asp#axzzliVQXEBgb (last visited
Jan. 4, 2012).
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personal gain would be significantly decreased. Furthermore, this would
give congressmen incentive to help improve every sector of the U.S.
economy while in office. The requirement forcing them to transfer their
stocks within two weeks of being sworn into office will ensure that members
of Congress do not have the ability to invest in individual companies while
concurrently possessing the power to financially affect certain companies
through legislation. Also, the requirement prohibiting them from
transferring their money out of the index funds until two years after leaving
office prevents them from being privy to nonpublic information regarding
potential future legislation or other nonpublic information. After two years,
there will also be several different members of Congress, and the
information will not be as relevant.
Because they would not be allowed to invest in individual companies,
political insider trading would no longer be a problem, and current insider-
trading laws pertaining to the private citizen would not be affected by this
requirement. Some may advocate that such a strict requirement is unfair,
but this heightened standard is appropriate for the leaders of our country.
Members of Congress are elected by their constituents to serve their
country through leadership-good leadership requires personal sacrifices."'
This nation needs honest and impartial men and women in office, and a
provision such as this helps ensure such desperately needed honesty and
impartiality. This type of provision would radically diminish the problem of
political insider trading. It would also restore America's trust and
confidence in Congress because members of Congress would not be able to
directly invest in companies with the unfair advantage of possessing
nonpublic information regarding legislation affecting the market.
2. Entirely Enforced by the SEC
If a provision such as this is adopted, the SEC is the proper organization
that should be responsible for providing oversight and ensuring that
members of Congress follow it. Committees consisting of their colleagues
rarely ever hold members accountableso and the SEC has more experience
349. ROD GRAGG, A COMMITMENT To VALOR: A CHARACTER PORTRAIT OF ROBERT E. LEE
30, 36-37 (2001); JOHN C. MAXWELL, THE 21 IRREFUTABLE LAWS OF LEADERSHIP 133-40
(2007).
350. Kristen Byrne, Ethics Committee (Finally) Staffs Up Amid Trial Delays, NATIONAL
LEGAL AND POLICY CENTER (Jul. 7, 2011), http://nlpc.org/stories/2011/07/06/ethics-
committee-finally-staffs-amid-trial-delays.
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and skill to provide oversight in securities regulations;"' therefore,
oversight should not be entrusted to a committee. Granted, the SEC
receives its funding from Congress, and thus, there may be some tension
not to enforce the provision. There is, however, no financially independent
federal organization to provide such oversight because Congress funds all
branches of the government, except at the state level. Thus, for now at least,
the SEC is in the best position to enforce this proposed provision.
Members of Congress, after elected, should disclose all of their
investments to the SEC, and when they transfer those investments into
index funds, those index fund accounts should also be disclosed to the SEC.
The SEC will also have authority and discretion to regulate and monitor the
types of investments to which this rule does not apply. Investments not
covered by the rule include investments in land, commodities, and personal
or family businesses. For example, the SEC could require members of
Congress to abstain from voting on legislation that directly benefits their
family business. Unlike the STOCK Act, this statute would prove more
beneficial because it would alleviate some monitoring responsibilities for
the SEC, an organization of questionable efficiency at times," by
decreasing the various possible stock transactions and providing a bright-
line rule. Thus, oversight responsibility would be delegated to an
independent outside agency, and those responsibilities of oversight would
be minimal due to the clear and unambiguous standards set forth.
VIII. CONCLUSION
For corruption in Washington to end, political insider trading must be
addressed. Members of Congress will be much less likely to play favorites
with certain corporations and industries if they are unable to invest in them
351. Insider Trading by Congress: Historical Timeline, supra note 84. Congress created the
SEC for the purpose of specializing in securities oversight and regulation. Id.
352. See Ed O'Keefe, SEC Porn Investigation Nets Dozens, WASH. POST (Apr. 23, 2010,
6:35 AM), http://voices.washingtonpost.com/federal-eye/2010/04/eye opener-porn-and
_federal wo.html (discussing how more SEC time may be spent viewing pornography than
regulating securities transactions); see also Sarah N. Lynch & Matthew Goldstein, Exclusive:
SEC Builds New Tips Machine to Catch the Next Madoff, REUTERS (Jul. 27, 2011, 3:41 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/07/27/us-sec-investigations-idUSTRE76Q2NY201 10
727 (addressing the SEC's embarrassing failures in stopping Bernie Madoffs ponzi scheme);
Thor Valdmanis, Senate Report Blasts SEC's Enron Oversight, USA TODAY MONEY,
http://www.usatoday.com/money/industries/banking/2002-10-06-sec.x.htm (last visited Jan.
4, 2011) (reporting on SEC's failures to address warnings signs of Enron's corruption, and
the SEC's incompetence in handling Enron's fraudulent activities).
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personally. Under current insider-trading laws, members of Congress are
able to legally escape punishment for trading on nonpublic, material
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